

DISPATCH

Chief of Station, Helsinki

FM HELSINKI

R01-251302

Chief, SA via Chief, SA

ASPA/IN/5

ASPA/IN/5

Return photos to ASPA/IN/5

OFRA-JOC

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CLASSIFICATION
 AUTHORITY
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1. Comments regarding the continued participation of ASPA/IN/5 in your BRISMA effort have been held pending customer evaluations of her reporting. With these in hand, we felt a more equitable judgment on our part could be made of her potential as a second short-term mounted KGB/IN/5 or as a long term resident asset in the USSR.

2. The UK implications of A/5's relationship with Gregory GOLOS and an assessment of A/5 for utilization in a UK operation, have been summed up in CYPB-2415, and it is generally agreed here at Headquarters that A/5 would be unsuitable for this type of an operation. Depending on the end results desired of an operation, a relationship with Soviets outside by a prospective BRISMA traveler, could be viewed either positively or negatively. If, for example, A/5 had been encouraged to further her liaison with GOLOS, then a trip to the USSR at some future date might have been recommended for the purpose of gaining additional information on his activities, especially on home ground. On the other hand a trip for FI or PR purposes would, we feel, be limited by those contacts in that A/5 would probably be subject to provocation once inside or inhibited in performing her given tasks by heavy surveillance. Her relationship with GOLOS, however, is only one of the restraining factors in deciding on a repeat mounted trip for A/5.

3. The evaluation of A/5's FI production resulting from her first trip have provided some idea as to her potential as an observer and reporter of positive and operational intelligence. Her overall rating as an observer was "not stated". Customer evaluations of the one positive intelligence dissemination resulting from her trip are enclosed. If found it to be of slight or no value. FULM gave a slightly higher evaluation of value, of importance, but accuracy could not be judged. Vital details were notably lacking, the reporting was vague. FULM's comments and indications of basic observations which would have considerably enhanced the report (time of sighting, altitude of plane, name of airport, take-off time, etc.) indicate shortcomings of A/5's reports. In comparison with reports of other travelers with little or less operational briefing than A/5 had, her reports rating was low. The long report on education, attributed to A/5's part, although composed to represent a scholarly treatise on the subject was evaluated as fragmentary, general and based purely on A/5's own conclusions. It struck us as being naive to attempt to analyze such a broad field as Soviet education with so obviously little factual knowledge or intimate acquaintance with the subject. This report was not disseminated. The only portion of CYPB-2415 which is being considered for additional dissemination is paragraph 2 containing GOLOS's statements regarding A/5's personal which A/5 was "reluctant to put in her report," and which CYPB-2415 included in his covering dispatch. A/5's reporting of her contacts was fair. All in all, we can say that A/5's production was not startlingly impressive, and justification for a repeat trip on this basis would be a little less.

4. Lacking a full personal assessment of A/5, it is difficult to state categorically whether or not A/5 should be considered for a trip on the basis of her qualifications. As a literature handler, the possible benefit of a UK operation, A/5 would have to have a comprehensive knowledge of the Russian language to cover both carrying in literature or distributing it. A/5 does not have this fluency. A question-never test would be, as we have discovered this past summer from operations of this type, a real, sharp individual,

5. As to A/S's successfully getting herself into the University of Moscow for a year's study, we do not regard the possibility with much hope. In every past instance, without exception, where Americans have attempted to make individual arrangements with Soviet universities for prolonged study, the Soviets have allowed them to make all the preliminary arrangements up to the final step. Just before closing the deal, the Americans have been told that they just become part of the American exchange program. Usually, by then it is too late to apply or the individuals do not meet the qualifications. The agreement for the Academic Year 1960-61 is not yet signed and sealed because the Soviets are displaying their usual changeability. We do know, however, as of 12 October, the number of students to be exchanged was 35. There are no standard qualifications for applicants, but all applicants in the past have been 25 years or over, have been candidates for a doctorate degree and have been fluent in the Russian language. It is highly unlikely that the pattern of selection will change for the Academic Year 1960-61. A/S fits into none of the above-mentioned categories and it is doubtful she would be accepted. However, should she for her own interest wish to obtain information regarding the exchange, she may do so by directing a letter to:

6. We have tried to give a return trip for A/5 from all possible angles, based on information we have here at Pool matters and evaluations of her first performance, and, frankly, there just doesn't seem to be a positive back to latch onto at the present moment. However, we are open to any further ideas and suggestions which the field feels may justify sending her back on another mission. It is possible that some new opening will appear between now and January, when, we understand, A/5 will be leaving Helsinki.

8. Traces on A/S's reported contacts, excluding the industrial guides, were negative. Although many of our travelers this summer ran into the same Soviet contacts time after time, none of them had come up before.

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